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Abstract
Information is crucial to the function of a democratic
society where well-informed citizens can make ratio-
nal political decisions. While in the past political enti-
ties were primarily utilizing newspaper and later tele-
vision to inform the public, with the rise of the In-
ternet and online social media, the political arena has
transformed into a more complex structure. Now, more
than ever, people express themselves online while main-
stream news agencies attempt to seize the power of the
Internet to spread their agenda. To grasp the political co-
existence of mainstream media and online social media,
in this paper, we perform an analysis between these two
sources of information in the context of the U.S. 2020
presidential election. In particular, we collect data dur-
ing the 2020 Democratic Party presidential primaries
pertaining to the candidates and by analyzing this data,
we highlight similarities and differences between these
two main types of sources, detect the potential impact
they have on each other, and understand how this impact
relationship can change over time. To supplement these
two main sources and to establish a baseline, we also in-
clude Google Trends search results and Polling results
for each of the candidates that are being analyzed.
1 Introduction
The principal characteristic of a functional democratic so-
ciety is having well-informed citizens that are expected to
gain useful and accurate information so that they can make
political decisions in a rational manner (Nadeau et al. 2008).
Then, a natural question that arises is where do citizens ac-
quire information? In the past, the primary source of infor-
mation was traditional unidirectional media such as news-
papers or television where “ordinary people” were mostly
information consumers without access to a proper avenue
to reflect their opinions. With the advent of the Internet
in general and online social media in particular, however,
we are now faced with a different and more complex sce-
nario (Dahlberg 2007; Weare 2002). On the one hand, main-
stream news agencies have largely exploited the power of
the Internet and fully expanded their news diffusion opera-
tions (Newman 2011). On the other hand, thanks to readily
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accessible online social media platforms such as Twitter, a
massive number of people express their political opinions
online (Jungherr 2014; Tumasjan et al. 2010). In addition to
the sheer high volume of information produced online, these
two main sources of information (i.e., mainstream news out-
lets and online social media) are interacting and influenc-
ing each other. Hence, a thorough analysis of the symbio-
sis of online social media and mainstream news is highly
desired and recent efforts have focused on this in other do-
mains (Jang et al. 2019). To perform this analysis, we focus
on a crucial political event, namely the 2020 U.S. presiden-
tial primaries/election. In the following, we further explain
the relationship between different news sources and their
role in elections.
Each of the sources of information can affect people’s
decisions in an election and they can also influence each
other. It suggests that the impact of a news source is be-
yond its own readers. Online social media is shown to make
individuals’ political opinions farther apart from each other,
yet it is also linked to individuals with more exposure to
beliefs of people on the other side of the political spec-
trum (Flaxman, Goel, and Rao 2016). Moreover, ideally, the
news should only serve as a source of information that ac-
curately reports the events of the world. However, in reality,
it influences what topics people are interested in, how the
topics are thought about, and perhaps following some sort
of agenda (Parenti 1993), which is an area of research ex-
isting long before modern social media (Berkowitz 1987;
Roberts and McCombs 1994; Berkowitz ) and commonly
known as agenda-setting in communications research. It is
important to be aware of this when consuming any sort of
media. In fact, one concern is that it has been shown that fake
news on Twitter can travel up to six times faster than real
stories, and furthermore it is humans, not bots, that are the
primary spreaders of this misinformation (Vosoughi, Roy,
and Aral 2018). On the other hand, social media campaigns
have had impressive results, shaping the public discussions
among many topics, and have had a large influence on public
opinions as well as the news cycle (Cogburn and Espinoza-
Vasquez 2011; Metzgar and Maruggi 2009; Kushin and Ya-
mamoto 2010). It has also been shown through polls that
people who align with a particular party are more prone to
certain misbeliefs about recent events, and conservatives and
liberals get their news from different sources (Bernhardt,
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Krasa, and Polborn 2008). In fact, most online news traffic
is from people visiting the homepage of their favorite news-
paper’s sites (Flaxman, Goel, and Rao 2016).
In this paper, we will explore the relations between differ-
ent sources of information under the context of the 2020 U.S.
presidential primaries/election from various perspectives.
These sources include mainstream news, Twitter, Google
Trends, and polls. First, we perform an initial analysis of the
data distributions and how their time series are correlated.
Second, we determine how each candidate is portrayed in
conservative, liberal, and neutral news sources. Moreover,
we determine the public’s sentiment toward each candidate
using Twitter data. Third, we investigate the co-correlations
among the candidates in both news and Twitter data to bet-
ter understand how the candidates are related in the two
forms of media. In particular, on a given platform, how cor-
related the mention frequency is for two candidates. This
helps to also understand how candidates may have been per-
ceived differently on different platforms. Fourth, we per-
form a cross-media influence where we identify how one
source influences the other. Moreover, since the interaction
between sources is crucial, we further investigate the influ-
ence between Twitter and mainstream media from a casual
perspective where we attempt to predict the trend in one
source using the other and vice versa. Fifth, we strengthen
our cross-media influence by using the Granger Causality
Test to quantify this relationship and test if one source is
adapting or reacting to changes in the other source. Sixth,
we analyze how topics of interest are different across plat-
forms, and candidates. This indicates which topics or issues
a candidate is most perceived to be related to on a given data
platform coming from both the aspects of the content they
are creating and what topics the public is mentioning when
discussing the candidate. Finally, we perform a toxicity anal-
ysis where for each candidate we determine the degree of
toxicity of their mention on Twitter. Our main contributions
of this work are summarized as below:
• We present the first comprehensive analysis of the two
major information sources that are being used to impact
the 2020 U.S. presidential primaries/election, by focusing
on Twitter and several mainstream news agencies.
• Each of our described analyses is presented from two per-
spectives with two goals. They provide direct insight into
the candidates themselves as they relate to the news, pub-
lic opinion, and the upcoming election. We also aim to
highlight the difference between news and public opinion
from a candidate-agnostic standpoint.
• We introduce approaches that nuanced ideas such as bias,
the topic mismatch between sources, influence, and toxi-
city that can be quantified.
In the next section of the paper, we will further explain ex-
actly how the data collected and provide an overview of the
raw data. Then, for each of the analyses described above, we
will further explain and demonstrate the processes involved
and present the associated results. Finally, we present a sum-
marized conclusion of our findings and discuss future direc-
tions that emerge from this investigation.
2 Data
There are four main sources of data that we are analyzing:
news, Twitter, Google Trends, and polls. For the news, data
was collected from Currents API1, which provides informa-
tion about articles such as title, URL, time published, and an
excerpt of the article. To obtain the full texts of the articles,
the Python Newspaper API was used2. The Twitter data was
collected using the Tweepy Python Streaming API3. A pro-
gram was written to download tweets that mentioned any of
the Presidential candidates in real-time. For Donald Trump,
only approximately 10% of tweets were saved given the fact
that his mentions were significantly more than the Demo-
cratic primary candidates. Specifically, since there are over
160,000 tweets collected per day, this should be sufficiently
representative for our study. We collected Google Trends
data directly through their online tool4. The poll data was
taken from RealClearPolitics5 where we collected their av-
eraged poll data to avoid the bias of a single polling source.
We further process the Twitter and news data by extract-
ing the following information: 1) the number of documents
per day, 2) average sentiment of documents each day, 3) a
point series of document publication times, and 4) political
topics of the documents. In Table 1, we summarize the av-
erage amount of documents of each candidate per day, i.e.,
tweets per day (TPD) and articles per day(APD), for Twit-
ter and news, respectively. A clear observation from Table 1
is that both Twitter and the news are quite variable in the
number of documents appearing on average per candidate.
Upon further investigation, we observed that the documents
per day distributions were not following a normal distribu-
tion, but in many cases had a long tail distribution. Hence, to
better understand the Twitter and news document frequency
data, we visualize the data distributions in Figure 1. We note
that different candidates do indeed follow different distri-
butions of coverage not only between each other but also
between sources.
2.1 Time Series Analysis Between Data Sources
In Figure 1, we had presented the distributions of the Twitter
and news data to observe the difference in trends per candi-
date in the two mediums. However, given that this data is
inherently time series, in Figure 2 we also plot the candi-
dates’ data over time from the four sources we have col-
lected, namely polls, news, Twitter, and Google Trends.
The first observation we make from Figure 2 is that News,
Google Trends, and Twitter data follow a similar trend. For
example, this is even more obvious when looking at the ob-
vious spikes of Bernie Sanders, Joe Biden, and Elizabeth
Warren. We observe that these are positioned around ma-
jor points during the primaries, such as the seventh Demo-
cratic Party debate in the middle of January, Bernie Sander’s
1https://currentsapi.services/
2 https://newspaper.readthedocs.io/
3https://www.tweepy.org/
4https://trends.google.com/trends/
5https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2020/president/us/
2020 democratic presidential nomination-6730.html
Table 1: Twitter and news data statistics
Candidate ElizabethWarren
Bernie
Sanders
Pete
Buttigieg
Kamala
Harris
Beto
O’Rourke
Cory
Booker
Andrew
Yang
Amy
Klobuchar
Tom
Steyer
Donald
Trump
Joe
Biden
Twitter
Average
#TPD
53,286 127,213 31,938 16,808 3,086 4,526 37,585 12,020 4,194 160,905 138,923
News
Average
#APD
7.66 18.70 6.18 2.23 0 .21 1.20 1.83 2.42 0 .94 141.23 25.07
Ratio 6,956 6,803 5,168 7,537 14,695 3,772 20,538 4,967 4,462 11,393 5,541
Figure 1: Visualizing the distribution of the documents related to each candidate per day.
early lead in February, Elizabeth Warren ending her cam-
paign after unsatisfactory results in Super Tuesday along
with Joe Biden taking the lead after receiving the endorse-
ment of many candidates (such as Pete Buttigieg) who ended
their campaigns before Super Tuesday, and finally Bernie
Sander’s ending his campaign in April of 2020. We elected
to use Google trends since they directly measure the fre-
quency of search terms and is a reliable gauge of the public’s
interest. Given that Google Trends shares similar trends with
Twitter, the frequency of Tweets is justifiable to use as a rep-
resentative measurement of the public’s interest. Others have
also demonstrated that Google Trends and Twitter are good
indicators of public interest (DAvanzo, Pilato, and Lytras
2017). In an effort to more precisely quantify and measure
the level of similarity between the news, Twitter, and Google
Trends, in Table 1 we present the pairwise Pearson correla-
tion coefficients between these different sources at the can-
didate level and provide an averaged column across the can-
didates. The first thing to note is that on average News and
Twitter are the two most correlated of the three data sources.
The next interesting is that while some candidates such as
Amy Klobuchar and Bernie Sanders have relatively stable
and higher correlations among all pairs, others such as Ka-
mala Harris and Joe Biden do not. More specifically, we ob-
serve that both Kamala Harris and Joe Biden had a high cor-
relation between news and Twitter, but the near-zero corre-
lation between Twitter and Google Trends (and very low for
News and Google Trends as well). The highest correlation
among all the three pairwise relations was Bernie Sanders.
Lastly, we note that Donald Trump was significantly below
average across all three pairwise data source correlations.
3 Sentiment Analysis Per Candidate From
Biased News Sources
It is well known that different news sources have different bi-
ases, with some having a conservative viewpoint, others hav-
ing a liberal viewpoint, and some being somewhere closer to
the middle. Although it would seem intuitive how these dif-
ferent news sources might portray certain candidates (based
Table 2: Pearson Correlations between data sources for each candidate.
Pairwise Relations Elizabeth
Warren
Bernie
Sanders
Pete
Buttigieg
Kamala
Harris
Beto
O’Rourke
Cory
Booker
Andrew
Yang
Amy
Klobuchar
Tom
Steyer
Donald
Trump
Joe
Biden
Avg.
News - Twitter .78 .84 .80 .79 .57 .74 .50 .62 .66 .17 .74 .74
News - Google Trends .24 .64 .37 -.01 .47 -.04 .06 .49 .33 -.02 .30 .26
Twitter - Google Trends .59 .70 .45 -.07 .21 .01 -.01 .44 .27 .13 .12 .26
Figure 2: Candidates’ poll, news, Twitter, and Google Trends data spanning the major points of the 2020 Democratic primaries.
on their political affiliation and personal ideologies), it is
hard to make objective observations about these differences
between these sources in order to understand the media bet-
ter. Thus, a specific quantifiable measurement is desired to
guide our understanding of these differences. In this work,
we utilize sentiment analysis (Liu and Zhang 2012).
More specifically, to quantify some of these differences,
we will look at differences in sentiment in news articles that
include the different candidates for the 2020 Democratic
nomination along with the current U.S. President - Donald
Trump. To measure sentiment, we elected to use the popular
method VADER6 which is a lexicon and rule-based senti-
ment model (Hutto and Gilbert 2015).
Figure 3 presents our initial findings showing the ratio of
positive to negative articles after having classified each of
the candidate’s articles across all news sources. We can ob-
serve that overall on average the mainstream news is pro-
viding a positive view for each of the candidates and current
President (although we note that Donald Trump had the low-
est ratio). We also note that the four highest each surpass-
ing the ratio of 3.0 were Tom Steyer, Pete Buttigieg, Cory
Booker, and Bernie Sanders.
6https://pypi.org/project/vaderSentiment/
Next, we utilize the categorization of the news sources to
present a second viewpoint as compared to an overall ag-
gregate, we only aggregate together news articles within the
same category of liberal, central, and conservative (as previ-
ously mentioned). We again perform an analysis of the ra-
tio of positive to negative articles, but this time taking into
consideration the category of the news source and shifting
the axis to have zero be the average, in Figure 4. Interest-
ingly these results also do not completely follow party lines,
since when we analyzed Donald Trump separately his con-
servative media has a lower ratio of 1.17 than liberal me-
dia having 1.36. When running the daily average sentiment
from liberal news and conservative news in the two-sample
t-test, we observe a t-value of -2.9, and a p-value of .0039,
which indeed suggests a significant difference. This means
that even though the conservative news sources officially
support him, the articles they write including him are over-
all more negative than the other news sources. There are also
many Democratic candidates who have higher conservative
sentiment scores than liberal sentiment scores. We also note
that some of the candidates such as Cory Booker and Tom
Steyer have a very high ratio among the conservative news
sources, but could potentially also be noisy, since they had
very few articles (i.e., on average roughly one news arti-
Figure 3: Overall news article sentiment taking the ratio of positive to negative articles per candidate.
Figure 4: Ratio of positive to negative articles per candidate,
with average shifted to zero.
cle per day in total) and were candidates that seemed less
likely to win from the beginning to the end of their cam-
paigns. This may indicate that the more moderate candidates
and less well-known candidates are preferred by the conser-
vative media. This theory appears to also apply in reverse
to the more popular and well-known candidates. Joe Biden
and Bernie Sanders, the two most popular and well known
Democratic candidates have lower conservative sentiment
scores than they have from liberal and central sources.
It is also interesting to note, that in many instances, and
also overall, the liberal-leaning news sources have a slightly
higher average sentiment. Second is conservatively leaning
news, with more central news sources having the lowest av-
erage sentiment. When the combination of two of these three
types of news sources (Liberal, Neutral, and Conservative)
are assessed through the two source t-tests, the pair Liberal
Figure 5: Ratio of positive to negative Tweets per candidate,
with average shifted to zero.
and Conservative gets a p score of .0001 and the pair Neu-
tral and Conservative has a p score of .0049. Thus, both pairs
have an average sentiment that is significantly different from
the other. On the other hand, the pair Liberal and Neutral
though have a p score of .28, indicating that the difference
in average sentiment between them is not significant.
For completeness, we also calculate the ratio of positive
to negative tweets per candidate in Figure 5. We notice less
variation around the mean in Twitter as compared to the
mainstream news articles (shown in Figure 4). Another thing
to note is that although the campaigns for Andrew Yang and
Amy Klobuchar were not successful enough to allow them
to stay in the race, they actually had the highest ratio of pos-
itive to negative Tweets (while also not even in the bottom
three for average Tweets per day).
(a) News (r=.50) (b) Twitter (r=.75)
Figure 6: Visualizing the frequency co-correlation between Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren.
Figure 7: Distribution of co-correlations among all candidate pairs in news and Twitter.
4 Candidate Co-Correlations
One type of influence that a media can exert on an ob-
server is to group candidates together. This can impact how
a viewer perceives the candidates. For example, if two can-
didates are often mentioned together as opposing each other,
could a positive thought about one lead to a negative thought
about the other? Or in the opposite case, two candidates of-
ten being mentioned together agreeing may cause a viewer
to have a thought about one that they then apply to the other
automatically. This type of grouping of ideas decreases ob-
jectivity, as what one candidate does or says should not au-
tomatically impact perceptions of another candidate. To re-
main most objective, media sources should not consistently
group candidates together. They should rely on information
that pertains to each candidate separately without impress-
ing upon the media viewer that two ideas are related. Also,
it could potentially be a strategy to construct candidates that
are designed to appeal to a certain smaller demographic and
then by design have them later endorse (or strongly oppose)
another candidate.
We decided to measure this level of grouping of candi-
dates by a media platform by their co-correlations. Candi-
dates were divided up into all possible pair combinations.
For the candidate pair (X, Y) two figures were made, one
for Twitter and one for news. For each day, a data point is
plotted on the figure. The x-axis denotes the number of arti-
cles/tweets published about candidate X, and the y-axis de-
notes the same for candidate Y. The Pearson correlation is
calculated for each pair of these co-correlations.
For a case study, we chose the pair Elizabeth Warren and
Bernie Sanders to visualize the difference in variance be-
tween Twitter and news because they show a strong co-
correlation in both Twitter and news as seen in Figures 6b
and 6a (having correlation values of 0.75 and 0.50, respec-
tively). Some candidate pairs have stronger correlations than
others – for some pairs, the co-correlation is stronger with
the news data than with the Twitter, while some instances
are the other way around. This relationship is shown in Fig-
ure 7 where the distributions of co-correlations are plotted.
These averaged co-correlations are low with 0.1662 in news
and 0.1309 in Twitter. This is because many candidates had
very low co-correlation, while some had much higher (such
as Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders). While the news
average co-correlation is higher by about 25%, a two-input
t-test measures a p-value of .75, so there is not a signifi-
cant difference in candidate grouping tendencies between
news and Twitter sources overall (although we can visual-
ize some differences in the distributions in Figure 7). Over-
all, this co-correlation can show which candidates are por-
trayed/perceived as related to each other. Here, we demon-
strate that there is not a tendency for news or Twitter to be
more likely to group candidates together than the other.
5 Cross-Media Influence
In today’s world, every day we have different forms of me-
dia influencing each other. This means that even if you are
not directly observing a certain platform of media, you are
still likely susceptible to its influence on certain topics. This
suggests that people who don’t use social media are still in-
directly affected by what people say about the candidates.
Also, people who don’t read the mainstream news online are
still indirectly impacted by what it has to say about different
candidates. Furthermore, it provides insights on whether it
is the public opinion (such as that found in social media)
influencing mainstream news, mainstream news influencing
public opinion, or bidirectional and to what extent are they
influencing each other. To do this, we quantify the influence
of cross-media platforms.
More specifically, one way to determine which of two me-
dia sources is influencing the other more is to shift the data
such that the time t on one dataset will align with time t− o
of the other dataset, where o is a defined offset in time. To
gain insights into the influence, we can vary the offset and
calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient. In this way, the
offset points at which the correlation coefficient is greatest
shows where one source of media is influencing the other. If
the coefficient, for example, is highest when data x is leading
data y, then it can be implied that data x is influencing data
y. To analyze these relations, we create heatmaps showing
these correlations to better understand the effect over time
and based on multiple offsets. In Figure 8 we visualize this
process and will next introduce it more formally while pair-
ing the explanation with this figure.
First, we perform this investigation by binning the Twit-
ter and news data into 5-minute bins denoted as T =
[T0, T1, · · ·Tn] and N = [N0, N1, · · ·Nn], respectively,
where we assume to have n + 1 5-minute bins in our data.
Note that in our data the initial starting time is November
11, 2019, and the ending time is May 14, 2020. To better
understand the potential influence between Twitter and news
over time, we can localize two-week windows, i.e., w = 2
weeks, and obtain the correlation between them locally (as
compared to the entire length of time) i.e., each row of the
matrix in Figure 8. Then, we can run this window across our
entire data over time obtaining multiple views of the corre-
lation (i.e., going from the top to bottom row of the matrix in
Figure 8 with offset as 0 hours). While sliding the window
of size w we shift in intervals of d = 12 hours. However,
Figure 8: Explanation of the correlation heat maps.
as mentioned before, it is also of interest to obtain the cor-
relation when leading one data before the other to uncover
potential influence that might exist in the data. Hence, we
utilize a set of offsets O = {−48hrs,−47hrs, · · · , 48hrs}
that range from -48 hours to 48 hours in one-hour intervals,
which are added to one of the data sources (e.g., News) while
keeping the other one fixed (e.g., Twitter) (i.e., adding an
offset is moving horizontally away from the matrix central
column in Figure 8.
However, when attempting to zoom in to such a fine-
grained view, it is possible that many hour intervals will not
have news articles being created for some of the lesser dis-
cussed candidates. Thus, to alleviate this, we harness the ex-
ponential decay of the Hawkes Process (which is commonly
applied to Twitter and news point series data (Rizoiu et al.
2017)). This allows us to convert our discrete frequency se-
ries of when tweets/articles are being created over time to a
single continuous line through the use of exponential decay.
In this case, the publishing times of each tweet/article are fed
into the Hawkes Process, and a smooth line with many data
points is output (as seen in Figure 8). At times, the news arti-
cles are published somewhat sparsely, especially compared
to Tweets about the different candidates. The Hawkes pro-
cess helps to smooth out this data that would otherwise be
very oscillatory if values too quickly returned to zero, and
does so in a meaningful way. Below we present the Hawkes
process:
Hawkes(News(t)) =
# events before time t∑
i=0
e−r∗(t−te) (1)
where i is the index of events (iterating from the first event
to the most recent before time t), r is a decay constant cal-
culated using the half-life being used, te is the time of event
currently being summed, and t is time input to the Hawkes
process. We let T ∗ andN ∗ denote the output of the Hawkes
process over the time when receiving T and N as input, re-
spectively.
Thus, for a given two week window representing row
Figure 9: Andrew Yang windowed correlation heatmap.
Figure 10: Donald Trump windowed correlation heatmap.
i of the heatmap, that has a starting time si, ending time
ei = si + w, and offset oj ∈ O, we select the section of
the Hawkes processed tweet sequence T ∗(si, ei) and news
article sequence N ∗(si + oj , ei + oj) to discover the corre-
lation hij for the cell (i, j) in the heatmap, which is defined
as follows:
hij = correlation(T ∗(si, ei),N ∗(si + oj , ei + oj)) (2)
which can be visualized in Figure 8 where the news arti-
cles are shifted according to offset oj when aligned with the
tweets for row i. Note that the entire heatmap is filled in
using the same process described above by varying i and j.
Here we present the visualized heatmaps in Figures 9,
10, and 11, for Andrew Yang, Donald Trump, and Elizabeth
Warren. Note that to the left side of the figures, the news is
leading Twitter and on the right side Twitter is leading the
news. Looking at the figures from top to bottom follows the
passage of time. Red indicates areas of higher correlation,
white is no correlation, and blue is a negative correlation.
These figures show over time how Twitter and news datasets
relate with each other by visualizing how the correlation be-
tween them changes over time and with different lags.
Andrew Yang’s heatmap is shown in Figure 9. It can be
seen that there are high correlation sections, and also sec-
tions that do not have a strong correlation no matter what the
lag. Overall, there appears to be stronger correlations on the
right side of the figure, indicating that on average, Andrew
Yang’s twitter base has a stronger influence on the news than
the other way around. The darkest red spot on the heatmap
Figure 11: Elizabeth Warren windowed correlation heatmap.
is in mid-February when Andrew Yang dropped out of the
presidential race. Interestingly, this high area of correlation
is on the Twitter-leading side of the figure, indicating that
there was a large response to his announcement on Twitter
before there was a large news coverage response.
Donald Trump’s heatmap is shown in Figure 10. There
are segments of higher correlation with no shift, and also at
exact increments of one day shifted. Donald Trump also has
the most stable document publishing rates both on Twitter
and news. This heatmap suggests that there is a daily sched-
ule of more popular times and less popular times that is re-
peated consistently and daily. This is why any shift seems
to quickly decrease the correlation, and the peaks of corre-
lation are all at daily increments. It does not matter how far
the data is shifted, as long as it is a period of 24 hours the
daily schedule will line up, and the correlation will be at its
maximum. This is supported by the fact that Trump’s Tweet
frequency is unusually high compared to other presidents
and has a tendency to dominate the news cycle.7
Elizabeth Warren’s heatmap is demonstrated in Figure 11.
We are not able to observe a clear trend as seen with Andrew
Yang (i.e., Figure 9), but it does seem to be leaning slightly
in the news influence Twitter direction. There are a lot of in-
stances where the high correlation periods stretch far in both
directions, indicating a period where the candidate is expe-
riencing an unusually steady period of coverage. However,
Warren has a few patches that exist only on the news lead-
ing side of the figure, indicating that overall news coverage
seems to have a stronger influence on Twitter information
than the other way around for Elizabeth Warren. We note
the dark red spot in April started around the time when she
endorsed Joe Biden as the Democratic nominee.
6 Granger Causality
While the previous section analyzes areas of influence, and
how these areas change over time, it does not answer the
more general question “Does News impact social media
more, or vice versa?” The fine granularity of the previous
analysis was helpful, but we perform a more general and
grounded analysis.
7https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/12/how-
much-trumps-presidency-has-he-spent-tweeting/
Figure 12: Granger Causality results.
More specifically, we harness the Granger Causality
test (Granger 1969) as a way to show potential causalities
between two sets of time series data, which has been heavily
used for analyzing temporal data/events on Twitter (Rizoiu
et al. 2017). The test is to see whether or not one time series
(along with lags of that time series) are helpful in predict-
ing the other time series. The Granger Causality is being
applied to news and Twitter time series to explore the rela-
tionship between them. To increase granularity, the Hawkes
process with a half-life equal to the average document pe-
riod was ran on each series. In other words, to establish a
principled half-life value, if on average news articles were
appearing every 1 hour, then this was the value used. The
test was run with lags up to 24 hours for both News cause
Twitter and Twitter cause News. In Figure 12 we show the
resulting sum of squared residuals (SSR) based F-test re-
sults used in Granger Causality changes over the different
time lags. We note that the average p-value for News influ-
encing Twitter was 1.64∗10−24, and the average p-value for
Twitter influencing News was 1.53 ∗ 10−12. Thus, although
we have justification that Twitter does Granger-cause News,
and News does Granger-cause Twitter, we observe a signifi-
cantly smaller p-value for News influencing Twitter, as well
as a significantly higher F score. This suggests that main-
stream news has a larger impact on Twitter conversation than
the other way around. While they both influence each other,
it is clear that overall, Twitter influences the news less. One
future direction to continue this work could be to explore if
the news always interacts with Twitter in this way, or if that
depends on the specific topic being discussed or difference
per candidate.
We also note that Figure 12 suggests that the influence
of each of these news sources decreases rapidly. After five
hours, it is just a fraction of what it was originally. While
obviously news articles and Tweets are still read for a long
time after being published, it is clear in the two figures that
any initial spike that one media source causes in the activity
of the other usually happens within the first few hours.
7 Topic MisMatch
As a campaigning strategy, usually U.S. presidential candi-
dates concentrate their rhetoric around certain topics, e.g.,
Donald Trump on immigration (Reny, Collingwood, and
Valenzuela 2019) or Bernie Sanders on income and wealth
inequality (Egan 2015). However, this does not mean that
a particular media perceives a candidate around the same
topics. In other words, it is possible that a candidate is as-
sociated with some topics different from those he/she hinge
upon. This creates a mismatch perception of what is impor-
tant to a candidate and how he/she is portrayed on a media.
In this part, we attempt to quantify this topic mismatch for
each candidate across three sources, namely Twitter, main-
stream media news, and candidates’ own Tweets. The pro-
cedure is described in the following.
First, we identify the topics associated with each can-
didate. To do this, we use the list of topics curated by
politico.com8. Then, we convert each topic to a numerical
representation using the word2vec model (Mikolov et al.
2013). Similarly, each text in all three sources (i.e., Twit-
ter, mainstream news, and candidates’ own Tweets) is con-
verted to a numerical vector by taking the average of tokens’
word2vec vectors in the text. The next step includes match-
ing each text to a topic. To do this, each text is matched to
the closest relating topic whose vector has the highest cosine
similarity to the text’s vector. To reduce the noise, we con-
sider a minimum cutoff threshold, and any text that did not
meet this threshold in cosine similarity to any of the topics
was discarded. The distribution of topics for general Twitter,
the candidates’ Tweets, and mainstream news are shown in
Figures 13.
Finally, we normalize each candidates’ data by calculat-
ing what percentage of the candidates’ documents were in
each category. This was done separately on each candidate
to accommodate for the fact that some candidates had more
documents than others. The distribution of topics for both
general Twitter, the candidates’ Twitter accounts, and News
are shown in Figures 13. In this figure, the darkness of each
square represents the percentage of documents for the corre-
sponding candidate that belongs to the corresponding topic.
We make the below observations based on this figure.
First, we can observe some mismatches between the top-
ics of interest for candidates themselves with those ex-
pressed on mainstream news and/or Twitter. Notably, for
instance, gun control, while a topic of interest for Beto
O’Rourke, is not a topic he tweets much about. This can
be confirmed by his low value (bright color) for gun con-
trol in “Candidate Twitters”, while mainstream media (i.e.,
“News”) and “Twitter” have highly associated him with
gun control. Next, for some topics, we see the consistency
between different sources for all candidates. For instance,
Cybersecurity has not been expressed much by almost all
candidates. Likewise, mainstream media and Twitter have
hardly associated it with any candidate. We believe this is
related to the nature of the topic as some topics are essen-
tially less “uncontroversial” and consequently less mismatch
occurs for them.
Our last observation is that while comparing News and
Twitter matching distribution in the first and second panel of
Figure 13, respectively, in general, mainstream news shows
more contrast. We attribute this more focused nature news
articles where a particular topic about a candidate is dis-
8https://www.politico.com/2020-election/candidates-views-on-
the-issues/
Figure 13: Topic distributions for each of the candidates across three data sources.
cussed in more depth compared to the informal and occa-
sionally erratic Twitter posts.
8 Toxicity Analysis
Unfortunately, many online social media users experience
some kind of toxic behavior such as sexism, racism, cy-
berbullying, etc (Chatzakou et al. 2017). Toxicity esca-
lates disagreements, irritates all parties involved, and hin-
ders progress in a debate or conversation. Toxicity is espe-
cially prevalent in political conversations where people usu-
ally take a firm stand and are polarized (Gruzd and Roy
2014). Hence, to further deepen our understanding of the
relationship between online social media and the election
process, it is worthwhile to determine the toxicity level of
tweets wherein candidates are being mentioned. To perform
this analysis, we extract roughly 400,000 tweets per candi-
date that mentioned them and run this set through Google’s
Perspective API9 to get an average toxicity score between
0 and 1 for each candidate. The toxicity levels extracted
per candidate are reported in Figure 14. Interestingly, the
toxicity level closely follows the popularity of each candi-
date. That is, the more popular (well-known) a candidate
is, the more toxic the conversion entailing that candidate is.
One possible explanation for this is that popular candidates
such as Donald Trump or Joe Biden are politically influen-
tial, their political statements naturally attract more people
to the discussion, and consequently, the likelihood of toxic
content is higher. This is further reinforced by the fact that
the American political arena is currently extremely polarized
especially when it comes to Donald Trump whose political
stands and actions have largely widened the political polar-
ization in the U.S. (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019).
9https://support.perspectiveapi.com/
9 Related Work
Our work is related to streams of work related to investigat-
ing bias in media, social media’s impact on elections, and
agenda-setting. In fact, there are many works that have in-
vestigated media bias and how to detect it (Hamborg, Don-
nay, and Gipp 2019). There has also been a lot of research
on search bias, which is built on the idea that when search-
ing online the results returned can be biased due to the
data or the algorithms, including related to political science
topics (Kulshrestha et al. 2017). In regards to social me-
dia’s impact elections, works have shown that Twitter com-
monly has spikes of conversation about topics recently cov-
ered in the news regarding presidential elections (Wang et
al. 2012) and have even attempted to predict election out-
comes based on social media (Tumasjan et al. 2010). The
final related are of work is that of agenda-setting (Parenti
1993), where there have been recent works focused on this
topic related to today’s big data, and specifically online so-
cial media (Vargo, Guo, and Amazeen 2018; Feezell 2018;
Lau, Rogers, and Love 2020).
10 Conclusion
Throughout this paper, we have demonstrated several dif-
ferent ways to interpret and display the data that we have
been collecting from several media sources. By exploring
the differences between liberal, central, and conservative
news sources, the influence that social media and the news
have on each other, topic mismatch, and toxicity, we have a
better understanding of how the different media sources in-
teract with each other and with their viewers when it comes
to discussing the presidential candidates. Analyzing this data
has shown some clear trends. For instance, one observation
we made during sentiment analysis was that more central
Figure 14: Toxicity of Tweets about Candidates.
sources had lower overall sentiment than both liberal and
conservative sources. We presented a few ideas about why
this could be, including that liberal and conservative sources
may have a tendency to write about topics that are favorable
in their domain, which would lead to a larger overall senti-
ment. However, this is a proposed explanation for the obser-
vations made from the sentiment analysis, and aren’t tested.
For future work, it would be interesting to further test some
of these proposed explanations and expand this project.
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